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The first trial by combat of the new
navy was against the French in the undeclared “Quasi-War” of 1797–1800,
which was fought to protect American
merchant shipping. The next naval action occurred in the Mediterranean
during 1803–1805, when war was
waged against the pirates of Tripoli.
However, the true test for the Navy, of
course, occurred during the War of
1812, when the value of the ships and
their crews was proved beyond doubt.
The author’s descriptions of the ships,
their handling, and the combat actions
is excellent, and his portrayal of the
people is equally impressive. The positive and negative characteristics of the
civilian leaders—including John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison—
as well as of the naval officers who became well known in American history
(Stephen Decatur, William Bainbridge,
Thomas Truxtun, Edward Preble, and
James Lawrence) are all examined.
This is Ian Toll’s first book. It is a product of his sailing experience, interest in
the period, writing skill, and thorough
research. The result is an excellent work
that should become a permanent part
of the library of anyone with an interest
in American naval history.
JACK A. GOTTSCHALK

Livingston, New Jersey

O’Rourke, Ronald. The Impact of Chinese Naval
Modernization and the Future of the United
States Navy. New York: Nova, 2006. 106pp. $79

Well written, succinct, and timely, this
balanced assessment of Chinese naval
weaknesses and strengths offers specific
technological development and procurement alternatives to inform
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Washington’s decision making. O’Rourke
is a naval issues analyst for the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. Specialists will want
to consult his related product, China
Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background
and Issues for Congress. First published
in November 2006, the latter report has
been updated regularly. Each report
contains details that the other does not.
Like its CRS counterpart, O’Rourke’s
present study draws on a variety of U.S.
government analyses; congressional testimony; and articles from the media,
think tanks, and academia. Additional
details are provided in an appendix.
Charged with presenting different
points of view, with an emphasis on official analyses, O’Rourke cannot be held
responsible for disagreements concerning the underlying assumptions or conclusions of his sources. It should also be
emphasized that Beijing’s continuing
reluctance to offer detailed information
on the purpose or scope of many aspects of its rapid military development
both raises concerns in Washington and
makes it difficult for policy makers
there to rule out worst-case scenarios.
O’Rourke has explicitly chosen to focus
his report by limiting the attention paid
to such issues of potential relevance to
the U.S. Navy as China’s aerospace development. In light of recent significant
Chinese achievements in this realm (including the acknowledged testing of an
antisatellite weapon on 11 January
2007), however, such factors should
perhaps be integrated into follow-on
studies by O’Rourke and his colleagues.
After all, China’s ability to project naval
power farther from its shores will hinge
on developing effective air defense for
surface assets. Certain military
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scenarios, such as those involving Taiwan, might motivate China to attempt
to deter American intervention by the
threat of nuclear strikes or damage to
U.S. space assets.
O’Rourke’s study raises important questions as the United States develops a new
maritime strategy. If preventing Taiwan
independence and promoting reunification is the present focus of China’s naval
development, what other national interests might fuel such development in the
future? What is the proper balance for
the U.S. Navy between supporting operations in the global war on terror and
maintaining (if not increasing) its presence and operational capabilities in the
vast, strategically vital Asia-Pacific region? What resources will be required
to meet the latter requirements, and
how should they be allocated? Finally,
what fleet and basing architecture can
best accomplish this at sustainable cost
to taxpayers?
Critical procurement decisions with
ramifications for years to come are being made in Beijing as China develops a
new five-year plan. As this dual strategic crossroads looms ever larger, it is to
be hoped that the two Pacific powers
can reach an understanding about their
respective regional roles and thereby
keep competitive coexistence from degenerating into a new cold war.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON

Naval War College
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In China’s Nuclear Forces Larry Wortzel
has delivered an exceptional monograph that demands the attention of
both nuclear strategists and China experts. The author, a leading authority
on China, Asia, national security, and
military strategy, is currently serving as
a commissioner on the congressionally
mandated U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission. He previously served as the director of the Asian
Studies Center and vice president for
foreign policy at the Heritage Foundation. Wortzel’s distinguished thirtytwo-year career in the U.S. armed
forces, during which time he served as
both assistant Army attaché and then
attaché at the American embassy in
China, culminated with an assignment
as director of the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College.
The title of this monograph promises
an expansive scope, and Wortzel delivers quite ably. While the scale of the
work is extremely helpful in keeping the
various aspects and issues in perspective, the most important new contributions to understanding the evolving
Chinese nuclear posture are Wortzel’s
treatments of “no first use” and nuclear
command and control. As stated by the
author, “The major insights . . . come
from exploiting sections of . . . A Guide
to the Study of Campaign Theory[,] . . .
an unclassified ‘study guide’ for PLA officers on how to understand and apply
doctrine.” These insights, however,
which Wortzel so adeptly lays forth, are
corroborated in other reliable Chineselanguage material.
It has become conventional wisdom
among China scholars to take Chinese
declaratory policy of “no first use” of
nuclear weapons at face value, excusing
away various past unofficial statements
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